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Abstract—Rowhammer is a hardware-based bug that allows
the attacker to modify the data in the memory without accessing
it, just repeatedly and frequently accessing (or hammering)
physically adjacent memory rows. So that it can break the
memory isolation between processes, which is seen as the cor-
nerstone of modern system security, exposing the sensitive data
to unauthorized and imperceptible corruption. A number of
previous works have leveraged the rowhammer bug to achieve
various critical attacks.
In this work, we propose a unified reference framework for
analyzing the rowhammer attacks, indicating three necessary
factors in a practical rowhammer attack: the attack origin, the
intended implication and the methodology. Each factor includes
multiple primitives, the attacker can select primitives from
three factors to constitute an effective attack. In particular, the
methodology further summarizes all existing attack techniques,
that are used to achieve its three primitives: Location Preparation
(LP), Rapid Hammering (RH), and Exploit Verification (EV).
Based on the reference framework, we analyze all previous
rowhammer attacks and corresponding countermeasures. Our
analysis shows that how primitives in different factors are
combined and used in previous attacks, and thus points out new
possibility of rowhammer attacks, enabling proactive prevention
before it causes harm. Under the framework, we propose a novel
expressive rowhammer attack that is capable of accumulating
injected memory changes and achieving rich attack semantics.
We conclude by outlining future research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to meet the growing demand of memory capacity
in the modern computer system, the cell density of DRAM
module keeps increasing. However, such high density ag-
gravates electromagnetic interference between memory cells,
which can eventually corrupt the data stored in the memory,
i.e., causing the affected bit to flip. The attacker can enhance
such interference to induce bit flip on purpose by accessing
the memory in controllable patterns, such as repeatedly and
frequently accessing, often called hammering. This attack is
commonly known as rowhammer. The nature of rowham-
mer attacks is to use software code to induce the faults
into underlying hardware in a controllable manner, which
is difficult to prevent. Since Kim et al. [43] identified the
rowhammer bug and demonstrated its pervasiveness in the
modern DRAM modules in 2014, the number and variety of
attacks leveraging such bug have been steadily increasing. As
the rowhammer attack allows the attacker to alter the data in
the memory without directly accessing it, the isolation between
different processes, that is seen as the cornerstone of system
security and previously thought to be safe, is severely affected.
Therefore, such bug not only influences memory reliability but
also causes serious security breaches.
The rowhammer attack has been actively explored by
researchers, where new applications have been constantly
proposed in various environments. For instance, the attacker
can corrupt page tables to gain kernel privileges from user
space processes in the Linux [63] or android system [67],
[68], while they can also modify shared binary files in the
memory to achieve privilege escalation [33]. On the virtual
machine platform, such as a public cloud, the attacker is able to
break the memory isolation between the VM and the host [70],
and access other co-host VMs without authorization [60].
As for the remote rowhammer attacks, which are usually
originated from the website or network, the attacker can trigger
faults on remote hardware with JavaScript from a malicious
website [34], gain arbitrary memory read and write accesses
in the browser [21] or even subvert the remote system only
by sending network packets [51], [66].
To better understand the landscape of rowhammer attacks,
there is a need to organize the various rowhammer attacks
in order to better analyze them. To this end, we propose
a unified reference framework to interpret the similarities
and differences of components in rowhammer attacks. The
understanding will be a useful guide for researchers to identify
new attacks and defences. In its most basic form, a rowhammer
attack is the manifestation of a bit flip due to repeatedly
accessed memory. This can be broken down into three prim-
itives: Location Preparation (LP), Rapid Hammering (RH),
and Exploit Verification (EV). In each primitive, we identify
common abstractions used from existing work, providing us
with a set of techniques which can achieve the intended
primitive. These primitives form the core of our analysis,
methodology of a rowhammer attacker.
Though the hammering methodology has much in common,
different attack techniques have different ways (or origins)
to drive the repeated access and to use the changed memory
(or implications) which serves as constraints on the available
primitives that can be utilized. Therefore, a practical attack
includes three necessary factors: the attack origin, the intended
implication and the methodology. Using these observations,
we designed a unified reference framework which is used to
analyze the composition of existing rowhammer attacks and
corresponding countermeasures.
Though our analysis, we also discuss limitation of primitives
in past attacks, so that researchers may find unworked combi-
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nation of primitives or even detect new primitives to achieve
novel rowhammer attacks. Through our analysis, we add a new
primitive Store Error (SE) to the methodology and identify a
novel rowhammer attack that is able to accumulate memory
changes and achieve expressiveness of attack semantics.
In summary, we made the following contributions in this
paper.
• Presenting a unified analysis framework, that indicates
three factors for understanding rowhammer attacks.
• Summarizing all existing attack techniques and providing
the methodology for conducting a rowhammer attack.
• Analyzing and classifying existing rowhammer attacks
and countermeasures under the unified framework.
• Proposing a novel expressive rowhammer attack based on
the framework and also discussing other possible future
directions of rowhammer research.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide necessary background for this
paper, showing the DRAM’s architecture and recent develop-
ment, also introducing the principle of rowhammer bug.
A. DRAM
As the most commonly used memory module, DRAM (Dy-
namic Random Access Memory) has much simpler structure
and larger capacity than other memory modules such as SRAM
(Static Random Access Memory). In modern memory systems,
the DRAM modules need to be encapsulated and assembled
before they can be connected to the CPU, hence there are
multiple layers between CPU and DRAM modules. First the
memory system is generally organized in multiple memory
channels and each of them is handled by dedicated memory
controller. Every channel contains multiple DIMMs (Dual
Inline Memory Module), i.e., the physical modules on the
motherboard. The DIMM consists of one or two ranks, which
normally are the sides of the physical module. A rank is further
partitioned into multiple DRAM chips or multiple banks. The
bank is an array of memory rows and has a row buffer to cache
the latest accessed row. The typical architecture of DRAM is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Rank0
Chip0DIMM0
Channel
DIMM1
Chip1 Chip2 Chip3 Chip4 Chip5 Chip6 Chip7
Rank1 Bank0
Fig. 1. DRAM architecture
The DRAM cell is made up of a transistor and a capac-
itor. The transistor controls the access to the cell while the
capacitor stores the bit value by being charged or discharged.
As charges that are held in the DRAM decays, in order to
ensure the integrity of the data, DRAM cells are required
to be periodically refreshed. The refresh interval should not
be longer than 64 ms, typically between 32 and 64 ms.
Increased demand of memory capacity in recent years resulted
in the growing density of DRAM cells. As a result, electrical
interference between cells have become more severe. This
electrical interference between memory cells is much easier
to affect the charge state of the capacitor inducing bit flips
known as disturbance errors [43].
B. Rowhammer Bug
The occurrence of rowhammer is an unanticipated result
during the improvement process of DRAM modules. Modern
high-density DRAM is threatened by the potential disturbance
errors, and the rowhammer bug deliberately amplifies the
threat. It activates a memory region in special patterns to
exacerbate charge leaking of cells in that area, corrupting the
sensitive data stored in the memory. In practical attacks, the
special pattern used for rowhammer is usually to repeatedly
access certain memory rows with a high frequency, just similar
as “hammering” memory rows. That is why such bug is called
as rowhammer [43]. The assembly code Attack_Loop used
on Intel/AMD machines for inducing rowhammer bug is
shown below. The instruction clflush can flush data from
the cache to ensure the access indeed reaches to the DRAM.
1 Attack_Loop:
2 mov (addr_X), %rax // read the row X
3 mov (addr_Y), %rbx // read the row Y
4 clflush (addr_X) // flush X from cache
5 clflush (addr_Y) // flush Y from cache
6 jmp Attack_Loop
Due to the existence of row buffer, two aggressor rows X and
Y are alternately opened and closed in the attack code, in order
to avoid reading data from row buffer rather than DRAM. By
hammering aggressor rows, the attacker can induce bit flips
in the adjacent memory region, and then further exploit it to
compromise system.
Nowadays, the vulnerability of almost all existing DRAM
modules under rowhammer bug has already been carefully
assessed, including DDR3 [10], [43], [57] and DDR4 [9], [11],
[48], [53]. The assessment results show that both DDR3 and
DDR4 are vulnerable from the rowhammer bug. Meanwhile, a
number of patents aiming to leverage the rowhammer bug have
been filed [15]–[18], [31], [32]. Recently, some rowhammer-
like attacks are also exploited on other memory modules
such as Flash memory [23], [45], [46], and their principle
are similar with rowhammer attacks on the DRAM. As a
widespread and threatening security issue, the rowhammer bug
deserves to be analyzed carefully, so that we further propose a
unified reference framework for understanding these powerful
attacks leveraging the rowhammer bug.
III. UNIFIED REFERENCE FRAMEWORK
A. Overview of the Unified Reference Framework
The framework is designed based on the observations we
made when investigating existing rowhammer attacks. To
conduct a practical rowhammer attack, first where the attack
originates from and what are the affects of the attack need
to be confirmed. Then both of them can determine the actual
techniques that are used to perform the attack. As such, the
framework can be broken down into three factors: the attack
origin, the intended implication and the methodology.
Attack Origin. The attack origin is the site where attacker
locates. In different sites, the attacker owns different privileges
which greatly affect the types of techniques he can use.
This factor allows the analyst to better predict the possible
attack surface that is available to the attacker and the ease of
performing a specific rowhammer attack by identifying just
the threat origin. Examples of possible attack origins are local
processes, website, network, etc. The further classification of
attack origin is introduced in Section III-B.
Intended Implication. The intended implication describes the
intended result of a rowhammer attack, i.e., the corruption of
selected attack target. Similar to the attack origin, this factor
also affects the design of actual attack method, since different
types of targets require different attack techniques to be used
for corruption. Besides that, it also allows for better prediction
over the possible attack vectors. We will describe the possible
intended implications in Section III-C.
Methodology. The methodology factor in the framework
provides a systematic way of organizing and analyzing the
different technical approaches used in a rowhammer attack.
To achieve this, we provide a description of the life-cycle of
a rowhammer attack and the corresponding techniques that
are required to achieve a specific primitive in the life-cycle.
Details are discussed in Section III-D.
The three factors above make up the unified analysis frame-
work. Each factor contains multiple primitives, and all pre-
sented rowhammer attacks can be analyzed based on primitives
extracted from three factors. Fig. 2 illustrates the framework of
rowhammer attacks. The attacker can leverage the framework
to understand the available attack surface and limitations of an
attack, maximizing effectiveness resulting in various practical
applications, such as privilege escalation, sandbox escape,
cross-VM hack and so on.
B. Attack Origin
In general, the origins of rowhammer attacks can be clas-
sified to either that of a local or remote origin. Every origin
has its own privilege set in the system. For example, the local
attack origin has the capabilities to access native resources,
abuse system interfaces, or even actively utilize code to create
opportunities to manipulate the memory. The remote origin
usually has more constraints and only has limited attack
surface to the victim system. For example, a remote attacker
is normally not allowed to leverage the instruction clflush
to flush the cache for performing rapid access on the memory
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Fig. 2. Unified framework of rowhammer attacks.
while a typical local attacker is able to. We will discuss these
two attack origins in detail below.
The local origin is able to be further differentiated based on
the amount of privileges the origin has, in other words, if the
attacker is able to execute privileged operations or not. Hence,
we further term the local origin as Privileged Process (P-Pro)
and Unprivileged Process (U-Pro). Given the prevalance of the
principle of least privilege, most of local rowhammer attack
origins are U-Pro. For such attack origin, attack techniques
which require system permissions are not available. However,
other techniques that can be performed in user space are still
valid. Typical instances include exhausting the memory to
locate the victim [24], [63], [64], [67], [68] or performing
hammering pattern which requires no knowledge of address
mapping [33], [63]. These attack techniques will be introduced
in the methodology. As for the P-Pro, in fact the attacker is
impossible to own the full privileges of the victim system,
otherwise he doesn’t have to attack. But the attacker is able
to take a process from some special scenarios, like the VM
or the old kernel, to obtain partial privileges. With the help of
P-Pro, the rowhammer attack has much fewer constraints. It
is able to gather in-depth information about the layout of the
memory [41], [58], [70], or even control the location of the
victim object in memory [60], [70].
Compared to the local origin, remote origin is typically
restricted in the way it can interact with the victim system,
since the remote attacker can only impact the system through
the service providing the remote connection. However, in
certain scenarios and with the help of specific mechanisms,
the attacker can also perform effective rowhammer attack from
remote. All presented remote rowhammer attacks are launched
from two remote origins, the website and the network. The
website is the main remote origin for the rowhammer attacks.
Attackers on the website usually use the JavaScript scripts
attached in the website to corrupt the victim’s sensitive data,
trying to escape from the sandbox and affect the host [21],
[34]. The achievement of website attacks greatly increase
the threat and practicability of rowhammer. Beyond that,
two recent works propose the remote rowhammer attacks
originated from the network [51], [66]. Previously, the general
assumption is that the network is not fast enough to provide
a high-frequency packet transmission that is required for the
rapid hammering to induce bit flips. This changed with the
advent of ever faster network speeds making rowhammer
attacks over the network possible. It has been demonstrated
that with 500Mbps [51] and 10Gbps [66] network, the remote
rowhammer attack can exploit the flipped bit to impact the
targeted system in practical ways.
Note that this classification for origins is not fixed and can
be updated according to the new scenarios if possible. The
importance lies in the intuition and methodology behind the
classification. More details about how these origins leverage
techniques from methodology to conduct attack will be intro-
duced in Section IV.
C. Intended Implication
The effect of a rowhammer attack is to induce a value
change into the targeted object which is (1) in a different
memory partition from the attacker and (2) the attacker himself
has no write permission to it. Hence, all intended implications
of rowhammer attacks can be classified based on the type of
attack target, using the privilege level of the memory partition
where the target is located and if its read permission is granted
to the attacker or not. With that, the targets of rowhammer
attacks can be categorized to four classes:
(a) Equal Privileged Readable Object (EPRO)
(b) Equal Privileged Unreadable Object (EPUO)
(c) Different Privileged Readable Object (DPRO)
(d) Different Privileged Unreadable Object (DPUO)
Moreover, the intended implication of a rowhammer attack is
to corrupt one of above four targeted objects.
Corrupt EPRO. In this case, the attacker and the victim are
of the same privilege level, such as two user processes, and
the attacker is capable of reading the context of the victim
object. For instance, in the work of [63], they achieve the
sandbox escape by corrupting the instruction flow in the NaCl
sandbox, which is at the equal privilege level of the attacker
and allows attacker to read the modification in the code. On
the cloud, the VM owned by the attacker may share some
particular objects with other equal privileged VMs, so that the
attacker can corrupt these objects and read their content to
verify whether there are any bit flips [60], [70].
Corrupt EPUO. Normally, due to the isolation between
different processes, one process cannot read the value of
another equal privileged one without system permissions.
Hence, the Equal Privileged Unreadable Object (EPUO) is
much commoner than EPRO. For example, the pointers in a
process, which cannot be directly read by another process, is
able to be corrupted and used for further exploiting [21], [66].
The SGX enclave is also not allowed to be directly accessed,
and the attacker can induce a bit flip in it and trigger the halt
of system, resulting in a DoS attack [40], [51].
Corrupt DPRO. Both of the two aforementioned classes
corrupt objects that hold the equal privilege with the attacker.
However, to make the attacks more powerful and threatening,
the attacker generally aims to corrupt those objects which
have different, or more precisely, higher privileges, in order
to elevate its own privilege. For example, the shared library
is a typical Different Privileged Readable Object (DPRO), the
attacker is able to corrupt opcode in the .so file to acquire
higher system privilege [33].
Corrupt DPUO. In surveyed rowhammer literatures, Different
Privileged Unreadable Object (DPUO) is the most common
attack target, as it is usually closely related to the authorization
and system security. The most typical DPUO is the page
table. Since it controls the address mapping of the process,
the page table is always taken as the first target of attacks
aiming to privilege escalations. A large number of presented
rowhammer works demonstrate how to corrupt the page table
and gain higher privilege, such as gaining kernel privilege on
the Linux [63], leveraging JavaScript to subvert system [34],
obtaining the root privilege on mobile [67], etc.
D. Methodology
The process of a rowhammer attack can be divided as
following steps. The attacker first selects suitable vulnerable
memory positions for locating the targeted object. After the
appropriate setup, the attacker then proceeds to perform the
hammering on the DRAM in order to produce the bit flip.
Verification will then be performed to ensure that the intended
exploitable bit error is indeed registered. As can be seen
from the above description, the rowhammer attack life-cycle
contains three primitives: Location Preparation (LP), Rapid
Hammering (RH) and Exploit Verification (EV).
1) Location Preparation (LP): In a DRAM module, the
positions of those bits vulnerable from rowhammer are usually
fixed. If the attacker wants to impact the system with bit errors
caused by rowhammer, first he needs to locate the victim
object to a memory position. The object can be modified
with desired flipped bits violating its integrity with potential
security implications. For most of rowhammer attacks, locating
victim is required as they have to corrupt some specific bits
in an object to achieve the attack. That said, in some special
scenarios, the locating of victim is not necessary, like that
of crashing the system or DOS attack as they only require
random bits to be flipped to achieve the desired effect. Hence
such attacks can directly start from Rapid Hammering (RH).
Note that the profiling of entire memory to gain the knowledge
of vulnerable bit positions in advance is not the prerequisite
for the locating stage. This is because it can also be achieved
by spraying objects or trying different positions. There are a
number of techniques for locating victim in prior rowhammer
works, including:
(A1) Object Spraying. This technique is to spray a large
amount of victim objects (e.g., page table) to nearly fill the
memory, so that with more possibilities the victim is located
on the vulnerable memory position where contains intended
bit flip [34], [63], [64].
(A2) Forced Padding. This technique leverages certain system
mechanisms, such as buddy allocator, to craft special memory
allocation pattern (taking up whole available memory space),
then force the OS to pad the victim object to the memory
position that is deliberately left [21], [24], [29], [66], [67].
(A3) Induced Replacement. This technique is to utilize
special mechanisms, like memory deduplication or paravirtu-
alization, inducing the OS to replace the victim object with a
forged object, which is counterfeited by the attacker and has
the same content with the victim [60], [70].
(A4) Try and Abort. This technique keeps trying different
memory positions and aborting undesired attempts, until it
finds the vulnerable one whose distribution of flipped bits
meets the attack requirements [33], [73].
2) Rapid Hammering (RH): As the most pivotal primitive
in a rowhammer attack, Rapid Hammering injects bit flip to
the victim object, which is the key purpose of rowhammer.
To achieve it, the aggressor rows on the DRAM need to be
accessed rapidly, which requires attacker to bypass the cache
and get to the memory directly. Once rapid access to memory
is achieved, specific memory access patterns can be utilized
to maximize the effects of the disturbance and hence the
probability of a bit flip. Details of each step in the hammering
process will be discussed below.
Bypass Cache. The nature of rowhammer is the charge
leaking caused by frequently accessing on the DRAM, but the
existing of cache which stores recently accessed data blocks
the attacker’s effective access to the DRAM. So bypassing
cache is necessary for rowhammer attacks and it can be
implemented with:
(Ba1) Specific Instructions. Some system instructions can be
called from the user space to flush the cache, such as the
most widely used one clflush [43]. Intel also came out the
clflushopt, another version of clflush in its Skylake
microarchitecture. Besides that, some non-temporal access
instructions are also available for fast uncached accesses to
the DRAM [59].
(Ba2) Cache Eviction Set. Since cache is organized in
multiple slices whose mapping from physical address is fixed,
the access to those addresses mapped to the same cache slice
can flush the cache. The set of those congruent addresses
is named cache eviction set [21], [29], [34], which can be
leveraged for fast accesses to the DRAM.
(Ba3) Uncached memory. There are some memory regions
that can be accessed without going through the cache, such as
DMA (Direct Memory Access) memory [67] or RDMA (Re-
mote Direct Memory Access) memory [66]. These uncached
memory regions offer an available bed for rapid access of
rowhammer attacks.
Hammering Pattern. The way of conducting hammering
greatly affects the efficiency of flipping bits with rowhammer,
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Fig. 3. Schematic of three hammering patterns: the black rows marked with
a hammer are the aggressor rows and the gray rows are the victim rows.
so that it should be cautiously selected depending on the actual
attack environment.
(Bb1) Single-sided Hammering. Take random two memory
rows as the aggressor rows and alternately access them, which
is possible to induce bit flips in the adjacent rows. As shown
in the Fig. 3(a), such pattern only hammers the victim row
from single side, which is generally flexible but slow.
(Bb2) Double-sided Hammering. This pattern marks two
rows adjacent to the victim row as the aggressor rows, as
shown in the Fig. 3(b). The double-sided hammering pattern is
more efficient but complicated than the single-sided one. In the
practical attacks, such pattern usually requires the knowledge
of virtual-to-physical mappings or at least a large physically
contiguous memory region. Consequently it normally need to
leverage system interface (e.g., /proc/self/pagemap) or special
mechanisms (e.g. huge page).
(Bb3) One-location Hammering. With the usage of close-
page policy or adaptive policy in the system, the hammering
to the same row can also induce bit flips in the memory, as the
cached row in the row buffer would be automatically evicted
by the OS. The Fig. 3(c) shows the pattern of one-location
hammering, the attacker just needs to hammer one aggressor
row for injecting bit errors. Usually such pattern is weaker and
slower than the other two patterns, but it is much stealthier as
it requires no privileges [33], [51].
3) Exploit Verification (EV): With the primitive RH, one
possible bit might be flipped in the victim object, however
the corresponding error may not be the one that is desired.
Hence, the attacker needs to conduct the verification and then
he can continue to exploit it for further applications. The
verification of injected bit flips is an important stage in the
rowhammer attack. Based on the intended implication, i.e.,
the targeted object corrupted by the attack, the techniques used
for verification are different, which can be roughly categorized
into two types:
(C1) Directly Read. If the target is readable for both parties
(the attacker and the victim), the attacker can directly read the
memory to check if the injected bit flip is achieved.
(C2) Behavior Judgment. Sometimes since the target is not
readable, the attacker cannot verify the result through a simple
read. Therefore, the verification of injected bit flips has to
be inferred by observing the victim’s behavior. If the victim
behaves as expected, the injected bit flip can be considered as
a success.
The exploiting of verified bit flips is the last step to
achieve intended implication, which can be further leveraged
to generate various practical security applications. In terms of
the privilege level of the target, the attacker can escalate his
privilege by corrupting higher privileged objects, or compro-
mise inaccessible data by corrupting equal privileged objects.
The primitive Exploit Verification is also the major target of
current rowhammer countermeasures, more details about such
defence will be introduced in Section V.
IV. ATTACKS
In this section, we collect all presented rowhammer attacks
from previous literatures and analyze them with our unified
framework. Based on different attack origins, we demonstrate
how to leverage the methodology to design the process of a
rowhammer attack to achieve intended implications. We also
discuss possible security applications that can be exploited
from the achieved implications.
A. Local Rowhammer Attacks
Local attack usually is the least constrained one among all
types of attacks, since it has the most resources that is available
to approach its target. Similarly, the rowhammer attack driven
by the local origin is also the most powerful type. Hence,
a large amount of previous rowhammer attacks aim to be
performed locally [19], [24], [33], [60], [63], [67], [68], [70],
[73]. As previously described, the local rowhammer attack
can be categorized into either Unprivileged Process (U-Pro)
or Privileged Process (P-Pro) dependent on the privilege of
the local process.
Unprivileged Process (U-Pro). For the security of the sys-
tem, most user-mode processes are unprivileged, so that they
cannot access sensitive data without system permissions. It
effectively prevents the malicious user from modifying other
processes’ data or corrupting kernel. However, the presence
of rowhammer attack breaks this security mechanism. As
rowhammer attack can modify the data without accessing it,
even an unprivileged process can cross the domain boundary
and corrupt targeted object that was impossible to be touched.
Based on the proposed rowhammer framework, in order to
design a rowhammer attack that aims to realize certain intend
implication, first the techniques that are available on the
current origin need to be selected and then combined to
conduct the process of actual attacks.
In the primitive Location Preparation, the victim is required
to be steered towards the memory position which has the
desired bit flip. However, as the U-Pro cannot manipulate
memory at will, directly allocating the victim to that position is
infeasible. This is because the memory allocation is controlled
by the MMU and all details of the physical address layer are
invisible to normal users. To cope with the problem, multiple
novel techniques in the methodology are adopted. First, an
empirical way is to use the technique (A1) Object Spraying
which exhausts all available memory regions, hoping one of
them contains the targeted position [63], [64]. This method
is simple, however it causes large memory footprints, which
obviously affects the performance and alerts the victim. There-
fore currently it is not that preferred. Another probabilistic
technique for locating the victim is to use the technique (A4)
Try and Abort, which tries to test every position to find a
desired one [33], [73]. The method is stealthy and hard to
be discovered as it does not increase the memory pressure.
However since the probability that the victim to be located
on the desired position is usually very small, the locating
stage takes a long time. Hence it is a trade-off between
stealth and speed. Noting that during the locating, the attacker
usually leverages side-channel techniques to leak the address
information of victim to promote the attacks. Besides these
probabilistic techniques, in order to implement deterministic
locating, the U-Pro can also leverage those primitives aiming
to steer the victim precisely, such as the technique (A2) Forced
Padding. It can be achieved with the help of certain system
mechanisms, such as the buddy allocator, in the user space.
By abusing buddy allocator to reuse and partition memory in a
predictable way, the attacker can occupy free memory at a fine-
grained level and force the OS to pad the victim to a controlled
position. The so-called Phys Feng Shui method [67] is a typical
example, and its variations are used in many works [24], [29],
[66], [68].
As for the Rapid Hammering on the victim, the attacker
needs to (1) bypass the cache and (2) choose the hammering
pattern. On the x86 platform, the U-Pro is allowed to leverage
(Ba1) Specific Instructions, like the clflush [43], to flush
the cache ensuring access to the DRAM instead of the cache.
Sometimes such instruction is disabled, like in the NaCl
sandbox [63], the attacker may can utilize other non-temporal
instructions to achieve it [59]. However in the ARM platform,
since the cache flush instructions are privileged and non-
temporal instructions are not available, the attacker has to in-
troduce the (Ba3) Uncached Memory to perform rapid access.
On the mobile devices, the DMA memory becomes the main
attack vector, as it can offer uncached access to the memory
and open a contiguous physical memory space [29], [67].
Besides that, the technique (Ba2) Cache Eviction Set is also
a candidate for an unprivileged attacker who can neither use
cache flush instruction nor leverage uncached memory [14],
[19], [34]. With the ability of bypassing the cache, the attacker
is able to select suitable pattern to perform hammering. The
efficiency of error injection in the rowhammer attacks would
be greatly affected by the hammering pattern, normally (Bb1)
Single-sided Hammering is weaker than (Bb2) Double-sided
Hammering as it usually induces less bit flips and takes longer
time. Whereas, in the rowhammer attacks originated from the
U-Pro, the single-sided hammering is more applicable as it
requires no privileges, while the double-sided one usually asks
for system permissions or special memory mechanisms like
huge page or DMA. Recent work [33] proposes another new
hammering pattern named (Bb3) One-location Hammering.
They claim that both single-sided hammering and double-
sided hammering are mainly based on the open-page policy.
When the close-page policy or adaptive policy are enabled,
one-location hammering can also induce bit flips [51]. The
experiment results show that the one-location hammering is
effective for bit flip injection, but it is weaker than prior two
hammering patterns.
Once the bit is flipped, it needs to be verified whether it
is the desired one and then to be successfully exploited. The
attacker decides the verification method based on his intended
implication. If the intended implication aims to corrupt the
readable objects, such as EPRO or DPRO, he is able to (C1)
Directly Read the target to verify the bit flip. Otherwise, the
technique (C2) Behaviour Judgement is adopted to check the
validity of injected bit flip, like checking the pointed target of
the corrupted page table [24], [63], [67]. Later, the attacker
can exploit the flip to result applications that aim to harm the
system. Actually, the intended implication has a deterministic
influence to the type of exploited application. If it is to corrupt
the equal privileged objects, like EPRO or EPUO, the attacker
can leverage the bit error to affect another user process in
local, like the sensitive code in the browser [63]. However, if
the implication aims to corrupt the different privileged objects,
such as the shared library, the attacker is capable of escalating
his privileges to gain the whole system [33].
Privileged Process (P-Pro). The local rowhammer attacks
originated from P-Pro has more privileges than those from
U-Pro. However, in the actual attacks, the P-Pro is generally
provided by some especial scenarios, like the VM or old
kernel, which also restrain the extensive use of such attacks.
Compared with U-Pro, P-Pro allows the attacker to leverage
nearly all techniques in the methodology to conduct a rowham-
mer attack.
First, according to the methodology, the victim is required
to be located on the right position. All techniques used for
Location Preparation in the rowhammer attacks driven by the
U-Pro are also available for privileged rowhammer attacks.
Beyond that, as the attacker has more system permissions,
novel privileged techniques are allowed to be used, such as
the (A3) Induced Replacement. the P-Pro is able to read the
content of the target and forge a fake object that contains the
same data. Then he can adopt especial system mechanisms
like memory deduplication to merge them as COW (Copy On
Write) pages, replacing the target with attacker’s controlled
pages to achieve locating [60]. If the P-Pro owns higher
privilege, it even can directly guide the OS to redirect from
the original object to the forged object, which will replace
the attack target [70]. Theoretically, such technique can also
be adopted by the U-Pro, but as its achievement generally re-
quires certain privileges, it is the last choice in the unprivileged
rowhammer attacks.
In the RH phase, the privileged attacker is permitted to
utilize the system calls or interfaces to flip desired bit in the
victim. For instance, he can directly use clflush instruction
to bypass the cache and carry out fast access on the DRAM,
or leverage /proc/self/pagemap to obtain the virtual-to-physical
address mapping [19], which greatly reduces the difficulty of
the attack. So for the attacker who owns all primitives, he can
perform rapid hammering in a very easy way. First he reads
the pagemap interface to gain information of address; then
finds out physical adjacent rows of victim; finally runs (Bb2)
Double-sided Hammering to inject a bit flip. However, the
attacker with such high privilege is impractical in the actual
attacks, indeed he usually only has partial privileges. Hence,
in general the injection of bit flip is achieved by combining
unprivileged techniques with certain privileged techniques.
The primitive EV in the privileged rowhammer attacks also
depends on the intended implication of the attack. Methods for
verifying injected bit flip are determined based on whether the
corrupted object is readable, like what U-Pro does. Compared
with the unprivileged attacks which mostly aim to cross
boundary between kernel and user space, privileged attacks
try to exploit the injected error to achieve more interesting
applications, as its origin is already privileged. When the attack
origin is on the VM, the intended implication is usually to
corrupt objects on the cloud, so that the attacker can cross
boundary between himself and host or other VMs [60], [70].
Besides, if the privileged origin relies on the old kernel, the
exploitation is similar with that in the unprivileged attacks, just
being much easier [19], [73]. But due to its less practicality,
there are only few previous works exploiting in the privileged
mode with the help of old kernel.
B. Remote Rowhammer Attacks
The attacker can conduct a rowhammer attack from a remote
client by sending certain aggressive data, like browser scripts
or network packets, to the victim system to induce bit flips. By
and large, the remote attack is more constrained and harder to
fulfill than a local attack, as all it can do is to send aggressive
data remotely and receive the feedback from victim. However
from the other side, since the remote attack requires less local
resources, it becomes more practical, and as the attack is
launched remotely, it is also more stealthy. There are two
common remote origins, the website and the network, that
are leveraged in literatures [21], [29], [34], [51], [66].
Website. In all presented remote rowhammer attacks, the
website is the mostly used origin because of its good conceal-
ment and wild spreading. The attacker generally uses phishing
emails or some other ways to trick the victim user to access a
malicious website, then injects attack code and steals victim’s
information.
For the primitive LP, as the attacker is also an unprivileged
one who cannot leverage any system privileged interfaces,
the victim is required to be located on the desired position
without any help of system privileges. Some LP techniques
used in the local rowhammer attacks are also available for
website rowhammer attacks. A remote attacker can spray
pages to cover all possible targeted positions [34], store the
target to his controlled area where has the profiled flips [21],
craft the special memory allocation pattern to force a desired
padding [29], or just keep trying until it finds the right position.
However, some techniques, like (A3) Induced Replacement,
usually need privileges are not available.
After the victim is located, the attacker aims to inject a bit
flip to this remote hardware with the primitive RH. Compared
to that in local, performing hammering on the remote device
from the website is much more difficult. As the hammering
operations originated from the website are required to run with
the JavaScript, where there is no concept of virtual addresses
or pointers and no access to physical address mappings, the
attacker cannot achieve the hammering like what native code
does in the local attacks. First of all, the (Ba1) Specific
Instructions, such as the clflush, are not available any
more in the JavaScript. In addition, the browser normally does
not use (Ba3) Uncached memory to store the data, which
makes such technique also unavailable. Therefore, the (Ba2)
Cache Eviction Set based on CPU [21], [34] or GPU [29] are
introduced to the website rowhammer attacks. By accessing
congruent addresses belonging to the same eviction set, the
remote attacker can efficiently flush the cache and implement
fast memory hammering, which requires neither particular
instructions nor mechanisms. As the identification of cache
eviction set is a bit difficult, the technique mostly is adopted
in the remote attacks, instead of local attacks that have much
more choices.
The website attacker usually tends to adopt (Bb1) Single-
sided Hammering to inject bit flip, because the constrained
(Bb2) Double-sided Hammering is much harder for the remote
attacker. However, it does not mean that the website attacker
cannot drive the double-sided hammering. He can achieve it
by leveraging special tools or designing crafted mechanism.
For instance, the THP (Transparent Huge Page) is usually
utilized for the double-sided hammering [34], as it can offer
a large contiguous physical memory to construct a three-
rows region for the hammering. In addition, the technique
(A2) Forced Padding in the locating stage can hold a large
amount of memory which may also contains rows adjacent the
victim, so that the attacker can run double-sided hammering
on these controlled rows [29]. As for the (Bb3) One-location
Hammering, there are no previous works to conduct remote
rowhammer attack from the website. It might be a new
direction.
To verify the injected bit flip, the attacker on the website
can (C1) Directly Read the victim if the target of intended
implication is readable. Otherwise he can look into the action
of the victim, once the victim has abnormal behaviors what
he expect, meaning the injected bit flip is desired. Then the
attacker can exploit the flipped bit to cross security domain
boundary and make some applications. The boundary for the
attacker on the website is normally the sandbox of browser,
which blocks him from the host. Once flipping one bit in the
sandbox, the attacker gains arbitrary memory read and write
access in the browser, or even escapes the sandbox to access
the system without restriction.
Network. Different with rowhammer attacks from other ori-
gins, the network rowhammer attack runs on the victim system
without any code controlled by the attacker. All the attacker
does is just sending network packets to the targeted system.
As a result, the network rowhammer attack is considered as
the real remote rowhammer attack and it is quite promising in
terms of a new and practical attack. Similarly, the rowhammer
attack originated from the network can also be designed based
on three primitives in the presented methodology.
First, the targeted object is to be located on the vulnerable
position as required in the primitive LP. To implement it, the
attacker can simply use the technique (A1) Object Spraying to
spray the memory with targeted pages in order to maximize
the probability of corrupting the target. Or the attacker can
also keep sending network packets to consume the available
memory, then free the vulnerable position and pad the target
into it precisely. In nature, this procedure is a variation
of technique (A2) Forced Padding. The privileged technique
(A3) Induced Replacement is not available for this remote
unprivileged attack while the (A4) Try and Abort has not
been leveraged in such attacks. In short, locating the victim to
desired position from the network origin can be achieved only
by sending the network packets, which also means it need to
exhaust a range of memory on the remote victim devices.
Performing RH from network is very critical in the remote
rowhammer attacks. The attacker has to realize both bypassing
the cache and conducting hammering pattern only by send-
ing and receiving network packets. Bypassing the cache is
extremely difficult for a remote attacker who has no idea
of victim’s cache strategy for network packets. When the
victim devices use RDAM (Remote Direct Memory Access)
memory or clflush to handle network packets, the attacker
might use the (Ba1) Specific Instructions or (Ba3) Uncached
Memory to manipulate the network packets directly into the
memory without caching. Even neither of two mechanisms are
adopted in the victim devices, the attacker can still construct
(Ba2) Cache Eviction Set to bypass the cache by some special
mechanism normally attached on the server, like Intel CAT [9],
[51]. As for the choice of hammering pattern, since the attacker
cannot gain address information of victim through the network,
generally the technique (Bb1) Single-sided Hammering or
(Bb3) One-location Hammering that require no knowledge
of address mapping is adopted [51]. However, sometimes the
attacker can leverage the remote server’s own mechanisms to
perform (Bb2) Double-sided Hammering. For example, most
servers tend to enable huge pages for storing mass data, so that
attacker can make use of huge page to conduct double-sided
hammering remotely [66].
With the bit error injected by primitive RH, the remote
victim server is corrupted. To verify whether the bit flip is
exploitable, the (C1) Directly Read is available if the attack
target is allowed to be checked, just simply sending request
of accessing the target and then checking the content of
feedback [66]. The technique (C2) Behaviour Judgement for
verification of injected bit flip is not that practical in the
network rowhammer attacks. This is because the attacker can
only communicate with the remote device through certain
interfaces, and in general he cannot observe behaviors of the
internal objects. The attacker can exploit verified bit flip to
conduct various applications, such as privileged escalation or
DoS attack.
C. Summary
In this section, we summarize those presented rowhammer
attacks according to our unified framework, discussing how to
conduct an effective rowhammer attack from different origins
to achieve intended implication. Table I lists all previously
presented rowhammer attacks and displays primitives adopted
in each attack, which are marked with X. Note that there
are still a number of primitive combinations that have not
been exploited in presented works. Future works can extract
primitives from this table or even add new primitives to
conduct novel rowhammer attacks.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
With the rise of rowhammer attacks, a number of coun-
termeasures are emerged. For instance, in the first paper
exposing rowhammer [43], Kim et al. have proposed PARA
(Probabilistic Adjacent Row Activation) to prevent bit flips,
and soon afterwards they propose two improved counter-
measures named as CRA (Counter-Based Row Activation)
and PRA (Probabilistic Row Activation) [42]. In essence, all
rowhammer countermeasures prevent the attack by blocking
the attack process, i.e., the LP, RH and EV primitives in the
attack methodology. Once one of the primitives is prevented,
the attack will not work and cannot achieve the intended im-
plication. In the following, we introduce existing rowhammer
countermeasures and also propose our view on the defences.
A. Prevent LP
Locating victim object to vulnerable position is the pre-
condition for an effective rowhammer attack. Hence there
are some countermeasures designed to prevent the Location
preparation. An empirical countermeasure is to mark all
vulnerable pages in the DRAM and forbid the system to use
them, making the attacker incapable of locating the victim,
like the B-CATT [22]. However, such countermeasure has
been proved to be impractical and inherently insecure. The
performance of system would be degraded as a large amount
of memory is disabled. Besides, experiment results in [68]
also show that the number of vulnerable locations increase
during time, it is hard to totally disable all of them. In most
of previous rowhammer attacks [29], [34], [63], [66]–[68],
the attacker first needs to profile a large amount of memory
for finding exploitable bit flip, then further exhausts nearly
the entire memory to position the victim on the vulnerable
row. As a result, the locating always generates conspicuous
memory footprints no matter whether (A1) Object Spraying
or (A2) Forced Padding is utilized. Hence, preventing the
memory exhaustion is a possible defence to thwart primitive
LP [34], [67]. The memory allocator in the system should
restrain exhausted memory usage and the OS also should kill
the malicious process that consumes the entire memory.
For the (A3) Induced Replacement, it normally adopts
special mechanisms like para-virtualization [70] or memory
deduplication [60] to replace the victim with the forged object
controlled by the attacker. Therefore, this technique is not
universally applicable for all situations. Removing or disabling
its dependent mechanisms is a possible way to prevent the
locating of victim. The recently presented technique (A4) Try
and Abort is much stealthier than other techniques. It does
not exhaust the entire memory or rely on special mechanisms,
while it only keeps trying different positions [33], [73]. For
now, there are no formal papers presenting any effective
defence against this locating technique. Perhaps monitoring
the abnormal usage of cache can be feasible as it evicts the
victim from memory by increasing page cache pressure.
B. Prevent RH
As the most pivotal primitive in the rowhammer attack
methodology, Rapid Hammering is the major focus of nearly
all countermeasures. To prevent the attacker from bypassing
cache and performing hammering, countermeasures are pro-
posed at respective hardware and software levels.
At the early time, countermeasures generally try to pre-
vent Rapid Hammering by modifying the hardware setting,
eliminating the vulnerability fundamentally. As the primitive
requires to hammer adjacent rows for enough times in the
refresh interval, one proposal is to double the refresh rate
so that the hammering frequency is not enough for inducing
bit flips [43]. However, this defence would incur a high
performance penalty and has been shown as ineffective in [14].
Besides that, some special mechanisms are also proposed, such
as ECC (Error Correcting Code), PRA (Probabilistic Row
Activation) and TTR (Target Row Refresh). ECC can detect
and correct 1-bit error in the memory, however, it might meet
the difficulty of coping with multiple bit flips [43] by rowham-
mer. Nowadays, ECC is mainly deployed in the servers, and
normal desktop and laptops may not support ECC mechanism.
Besides,the latest work [26] successfully bypasses the ECC
and can reliably flip bit on the ECC memory, which totally
breaks such defence. TTR is adopted as an effective defence
against rowhammer in the new standard LPDDR4 [13]. It
refreshes adjacent rows if the targeted row is accessed at a
high frequency. The results in [67] show that TTR cannot
defeat rowhammer reliably as the attacker can still induce bit
flips on a Google Pixel phone with 4GB LPDDR4 memory.
Lipp et al. [51] also demonstrate that bit flips can be detected
far away from the hammered rows, which means refreshing
adjacent rows only is not enough for preventing bit flips. PRA
is a probability-based countermeasure enhanced from PARA.
It simply allows memory controller to probabilistically open
adjacent or non-adjacent rows, hoping to refresh vulnerable
rows before bit flips occur. Such countermeasures can mitigate
rowhammer attacks to some extent with less performance
penalty, but its effectiveness needs further verification.
In recent years, more and more software-based countermea-
sures are proposed, as hardware-based ones cannot be directly
attached to legacy systems. In terms of software, the simplest
countermeasure is to remove (Ba1) Specific Instructions used
for bypassing the cache, such as disabling clflush in the
NaCl sandbox [63]. Leveraging performance counter to detect
abnormal frequent access is also a common countermea-
sure. Like the first concrete software-based countermeasure
ANVIL [14], it utilizes CPU’s performance counter to monitor
the amount of last-level cache misses, and marks the addresses
if the amount exceeds a predetermined threshold. Once there
are enough accesses to other rows in the same bank, the
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victim rows are forced with an early refresh. ANVIL can
effectively prevent rowhammer attack from injecting bit flip
to the memory. However, the newly proposed (Bb3) One-
location Hammering challenged this countermeasure, since it
only accesses the same row and does not alert the ANVIL [33].
Recently, a countermeasure is proposed to detect bit flips
in [69], which combines sliding window protocol and dynamic
integrity hash tree. Bit flips in the frequently accessed rows
can be added to the hash tree for prompt detection. Such
countermeasure mainly relies on detecting the injected bit flips
rather than preventing them from the beginning of inducing.
C. Prevent EV
Let the attacker flip bit but prevent him from exploiting the
flipped bit is also a feasible solution. Even the attacker flips
a bit in the victim, if he cannot exploit it to cross boundary
between security domains, the flipped bit is not that meaning in
terms of impacts. The core idea is to isolate physical memory
to different domains and make sure that injected bit flips can
only arise in the attacker’s own memory region. G-CATT [22]
is an exemplary countermeasure to block primitive Exploit
Verification. It extends the memory allocator to physically
isolate two domains, the kernel and the user space, with gap
rows. Even the attacker flips bits in the gap rows, he cannot
induce bit flips in the kernel (e.g., page table) to achieve
privilege escalation. However, as to those shared objects in the
system, the reliability of G-CATT is doubtful. Recent works
show that CATT cannot manage to work. In [33], one bit
is flipped in the opcode of shared sudo binary, and certain
double-ownership kernel buffers like video buffers also allow
the attacker to defeat such countermeasure [24].
Indeed, the idea of preventing exploitation on the flipped
bit is very novel and impressive, spawning a class of coun-
termeasures. For instance, GuardION [68] is a similar coun-
termeasure that intends to prevent exploiting of flipped bit
on the mobile devices. It use guard rows to isolate the
DMA buffer, the main attack vector used for rowhammer
attacks on mobile devices. It guarantees that the flipped bit
only arises in the isolated DMA region, resulting in that
there is no exploitable flips for attacker. Beyond that, the
ALIS [66] proposed for defending Throwhammer also adopts
guard rows to prevent exploiting of flipped bit. It is a new
allocator to offer fine-grained memory isolation of network
buffers, find guard rows at the DRAM address space and use
them to isolate flipped bit from security domains. The latest
countermeasure ZebRAM [8] even isolates all data rows with
guard rows that absorb bit flips, which protects sensitive data
from malicious exploiting. Actually, preventing the primitive
Exploit Verification with guard rows is a promising direction
for future design of countermeasure, since it is effective and
practical.
D. Summary
In this section, we introduce existing rowhammer counter-
measures based on which primitive in the methodology they
try to prevent. Table II illustrates these countermeasures and
shows their defensive effect.
TABLE II
COUNTERMEASURES FOR ROWHAMMER ATTACKS.
Countermeasures Affected Primitive Description Reliability
(For now)
B-CATT [22] LP Disable vulnerable pages to prevent locating victim to such positions. ×
Detect memory footprint [34] LP Prevent memory exhaustion that is usually required for locating victim. ×
ECC [36] RH Detect and correct 1-bit error, preventing single bit flip in the memory. ×
TRR [13] RH Refresh adjacent rows if the targeted row is accessed at a high frequency. ×
PRA [42] RH Probabilistically open adjacent or non-adjacent rows to eliminate bit flips. X
ANVIL [14] RH Use performance counter to monitor cache misses to detect rowhammer attack. ×
Disallow cluflush [63] RH Disallow cluflush to stop attacker from directly accessing the DRAM. ×
Double refresh rate [43] RH Double refresh rate of DRAM to mitigate change leak caused by hammering. ×
Detect with hash tree [69] RH Combines sliding window protocol and integrity hash tree to detect bit flips. X
G-CATT [22] EV Physically isolate the memory of different system entities with a gap. ×
GuardION [68] EV Isolate DMA buffer with guard rows to prevent mobile rowhammer attacks. X
ALIS [66] EV Leverage a buffer allocator to offer fine-grained memory isolation. X
ZebRAM [8] EV Isolate all data rows with guard rows that absorb bit flips. X
VI. EXPRESSIVE ROWHAMMER ATTACKS
By observing existing rowhammer works through the lens
of our framework, we have identified a crucial limitation, ex-
pressiveness of attacks. Rowhammer attacks rely on hardware
faults present within the DRAM modules and hence position
and/or patterns of possible bit flips are determined, posing
a strict constraint on the LP phase of the attack. As a result,
existing rowhammer work typically uses simple, single bit flip
to induce coarse changes in order to achieve the attack. This
begs the question, how can we improve the expressiveness of
rowhammer towards a meaningful and composable attack?
To that end, we propose the addition of a new primitive
SE (Store Error) to the methodology as shown in Fig. 4.
The addition of SE allows the attacker to persist bit flips
and by accumulating it, enables the composability of bit flips
into complex bit patterns. More concretely, the attacker first
leverages LP to steer the victim object towards the vulnerable
position and uses RH to induce a bit flip in the victim. After
verifying that the injected bit flip is exploitable based on the
primitive EV, the attacker can store the correct bit flip to
the external storage such as the disk. At this point, a single
bit error is persisted. By performing such loops, the attacker
can accumulate multiple bit flips and precisely control their
positions, achieving expressive changes to the victim object.
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Fig. 4. Methodology for expressive rowhammer attack.
Intuitively, the threat of rowhammer attacks increases with
the number of bit flips to be injected, so that such expressive
multiple-bit error is much more threatening and can be applied
to a wider range of scenarios than previous rowhammer attacks
that generally only exploit single-bit error. Note that even
the rowhammer bug is possible to induce multiple bit flips
in a fixed memory region [43], [70], the distribution of these
multiple flips depends on the hardware property of the physical
row and is always impossible to meet the demand of the actual
attack. So, none of prior rowhammer works leverage multiple
bit flips to achieve their attacks. In the following, we discuss
how to implement the expressive rowhammer attack.
A. Support Mechanism
Store Error is the key of conducting expressive rowhammer
attack. It persists bit flips back to an external storage such that
injected errors can be accumulated for expressive multiple-bit
modification. However, its implementation requires the support
from specific mechanisms, since corrupted victim object would
be discarded in normal cases instead of storing back to the
external storage.
Disk cache is a Linux kernel feature which corresponds
to the memory cache. As a memory structure between the
main memory and the disk, disk cache stores the data that are
frequently accessed by the OS or user processes. Compared
to the memory cache, disk cache can hold the data longer and
have larger memory space. IO to the file is instead made to
this structure in memory, which aims to reduce IO latency
by utilizing free memory. Since the memory is technically
free but is actually “hijacked” by the OS, the OS himself has
to aggressively swap out the cache if programs request for
memory. Further, to ensure cache coherence, the OS uses a
dirty bit to mark that there is a difference between the file
and the cache, and that an update to the file is required. As a
result, once the OS flushes the modified disk cache, the dirty
pages are stored back to the disk.
A challenge to address is that the modification by rowham-
mer is not mediated by the OS and will be ignored when
flushing, so that we should leverage some mechanisms, such
as certain OS utilities, to trigger the storing of errors caused
by rowhammer. For the sensitive data stored in disk cache,
the expressive rowhammer attack can be very powerful and
practical. In fact, the page cache used in [33] for their
novel LP method memory waylaying is similar to the disk
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Fig. 5. The concept of composing expressive rowhammer attack, T denotes
the victim and D denotes the data used for legitimate modification.
cache. However, they only leverage it to avoid causing large
memory footprint. The usage for accumulating bit flips is not
considered.
B. Composing Expressive Rowhammer Attack
As an interesting mechanism that helps attacker to accu-
mulate bit flips, we describe an expressive rowhammer attack
via disk cache. Fig. 5 illustrates the conceptual composition
of multiple bit flips, which contains four stages.
• Stage (1): Location Preparation (LP). Load the victim
from the disk and locate it to vulnerable positions on the
disk cache.
• Stage (2): Rapid Hammering (RH). Inject one bit flip into
the victim T by rapidly hammering adjacent rows.
• Stage (3): Exploit Verification (EV). Verify whether the
injected error is one of exploitable bit flips.
• Stage (4): Store Error (SE). Modify data D in the page
containing the flipped bit with legitimate OS utilities, then
flush the changed page to disk. This enables the injected
bit flip to piggy-back on the flush and be persistently
stored.
With the last stage SE in Fig. 5, the OS ignores modification
caused by rowhammer when flushing the dirty disk cache
pages. Therefore, we first leverage OS utilities to modify other
data in the victim page to ensure the injected bit flip can be
stored back together. However, the fulfillment of modification
on data D is not straightforward, which is dependent on the
files that cached. We present an interesting technique in the
following end-to-end attack. Ideally by repeating these four
stages, a sequence of bit flips can be controlled towards an
expressive meaning which relies on the context of the attack.
C. An End-to-End Expressive Rowhammer Attack
Combining the support of primitive Store Error from disk
cache and the original rowhammer attack methodology, we de-
velop a powerful end-to-end expressive rowhammer attack that
achieves privilege escalation by corrupting the file /etc/passwd.
It allows any normal user to change his user ID without the
write permission.
Target Identification. Many important and frequently used
files are actually buffered in the disk cache, in order to prevent
the performance decrease if those files are swapped in and out
between the disk and the main memory. As a pivotal file in
the Linux system, /etc/passwd records many entries of user
accounts, which is located in the disk cache once loaded. The
importance of /etc/passwd makes it an ideal target, however,
the direct attack on the sector of password is not easy. In fact,
the Linux system stores the user password in an encrypted
format into a different file, i.e., the /etc/shadow file, which is
marked as an “x” block and not readable for normal users.
A different sector called UID catches our attention. The UID
determines the privilege level of a user [6]. A privileged root,
denoted as R, has a UID of 0. A normal user, denoted as U ,
has a UID started from 1000 in ASCII. Since the user with
UID 1000 is usually the root user of system, the UID 1001 is a
more interesting target to explore. Our expressive attack aims
to modify it to 0, so that the normal user can impersonate the
root. Table III lists the corresponding binary representations of
the UID sectors of the root R and the normal testing user U .
The modification from 0x31303031 to 0x30303030 requires a
chain of two deterministic 1 → 0 bit flips in the /etc/passwd
file, which is impossible to accomplish using techniques from
previous literatures.
TABLE III
BINARY FORM OF KEY DATA IN THE /ETC/PASSWD.
role ASCII code Binary form
root R :x:0: 0x3a 0x78 0x3a 0x30 0x3a
tesing user U :x:1001: 0x3a 0x78 0x3a 0x31303031 0x3a
Flipping a Single Bit. The /etc/passwd file is well protected
whose permission flag is set as “-rw-r–r–”. Therefore normal
users cannot write it except the root, which prevents the file
from malicious modification. However, based on the aforemen-
tioned rowhammer attack methodology, we can craft effective
attack method to alter one specific bit in /etc/passwd. In fact,
similar to the work in [33] that aims to modify opcode in
the sudo binary, the modification of /etc/passwd file aims to
corrupt a privileged binary file that is shared by the user
and kernel. As the /etc/passwd file has only one copy in
the memory, the spraying method like technique (A1) cannot
work. We adopt the technique (A4) Try and Abort, like the
memory waylaying method in [33]), to locate the /etc/passwd
file on the vulnerable position. Then we select techniques from
primitive RH, such as (Ba1) Specific Instructions and (Bb1)
Single-sided Hammering, to bypass the cache. We perform
certain hammering pattern to inject bit flip to the victim, finally
verify whether the flipped bit is exploitable by reading or
judging victim’s behavior.
Chaining Multiple Bit Flips. After one round of single-bit
flip, one of the required bits in the target UID is flipped. Note
that the victim file is still saved in the disk cache for the
next access. He needs to persist the changes. To flush the
flipped content to disk, we need the OS to treat the page as
dirty (or changed). This must be done in a way permitted by
the OS. In fact, a normal user does have the need to update
system files such as passwd, to change his user information
like address or the command shell. This can be achieved by
the commands with suid [3]. The attacker just needs to find an
appropriate command with suid to update his own credential
in the /etc/passwd file, which will trigger a disk cache flush
and cause the previously injected flip written back to the
disk. There are many system commands which can perform
such an update. The most common one is passwd. However,
as mentioned earlier, the password is actually stored in the
/etc/shadow file, so that it only flushes /etc/shadow rather than
/etc/passwd. In our attack, the command chsh [1] is chosen for
further exploitation. It allows normal users to modify their own
shell information in the /etc/passwd file, so that it can update
the victim file without the root privilege. After a single bit
flip, the attacker can mark the /etc/passwd file as dirty just
by modifying his shell information in the file via the chsh
command. Then, he can run the sync command which flushes
all dirty files back to the disk without root privileges, so that
the injected bit flip can be piggy-back on the flush and saved in
the disk. As a result, the subsequent reloading of /etc/passwd
file will maintain the previous injected bit flip. In this way,
multiple bit flips are chained together under the attacker’s
control, moving towards the expressiveness of a meaningful
attack step by step.
Root Privilege Escalation Our attack eventually updates the
attacker’s UID from 1001 to 0000. As the UID becomes 0,
the OS would misinterpret the normal user U as root. After
logging in as U , the attacker can perform root-level operations,
such as changing permission flags of a file or modifying
privileged system files. Hence, under our end-to-end attack, the
normal user is equivalent to the root and the attacker achieves
privilege escalation.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A. Direction of Attacks
With our proposed unified framework, novel rowhammer
attack methods can be conducted by combining unused primi-
tives or even adding new primitives. In the following, we give
a couple of directions for future research on the attacks.
Expressive Rowhammer Attack. As discussed in section VI,
compared to previous attacks that only exploit one single bit
error, expressive rowhammer attack is much more powerful
and also has wider application scenarios. Hence, promoting
the expressivity of rowhammer attacks is a promising direction
for future research, which can greatly increase the threat of
attacks. In our method, we adopt the disk cache as the support
mechanism for storing injected error, we believe there are
more unknown mechanisms can be used for achieving such
expressive attacks.
Network Rowhammer Attack. Originating rowhammer at-
tacks from network is the latest trend, and perhaps it could
become the mainstream of future research with the rapid
development of network. As the network rowhammer attack
is enough stealthy and practical, it is able to wreak havoc on
the remote server without attracting attention, which exposes
the server to the great threat. It is necessary to analyze such
novel attack and enable proactive prevention.
Mobile Rowhammer Attack. Nowadays, mobile devices go
deeper into people’s lives than computers. As a result, mobile
rowhammer attack is also a possible direction for future
research. Actually, there are already a number of attacks
aiming to corrupt sensitive data or even escalate privilege from
the mobile devices being proposed. However, as the upgrade
of mobile devices is generally much faster, the corresponding
attack techniques also need to be updated.
B. Direction of Countermeasures
The rising of rowhammer attacks accelerate the research on
the countermeasures, various defences are presented in order to
effectively defeat the attack. However, up to now, there are no
countermeasures can absolutely defend against all rowhammer
attacks. Hence, crafting more effective countermeasures is very
important in the future research.
Hardware Solutions. The rowhammer bug is the inherent
vulnerability in the modern DRAM modules which have high
cell density. Therefore, to solve this problem fundamentally,
we need to improve the structure of hardware, eradicating
the disturbance errors in the memory without affecting its
performance. It is a possible direction for designing counter-
measures, even it may be hard to be achieved and cannot be
applied on the legacy systems.
Probabilistically Refresh. Refreshing the victim row before
it is flipped can effectively prevent the rowhammer attacks.
But in practical attacks, the judgement of victim row is
difficult since the pattern or frequency of hammering has no
strict standards, resulting the countermeasure is insufficient
for defending attacks. Hence, probabilistically refreshing rows
may be a better solution. It randomly refresh all rows in the
memory and doesn’t mark victim rows, which has a high
probability of interrupting the process of attack.
Isolate with Gap. As the most popular direction of designing
countermeasures, isolating different domains’ memory with
guard rows shows strong effectiveness on defending rowham-
mer attacks. It trades off between security and performance,
sacrificing part of rows to gap the sensitive data from the
attacker. Such countermeasure is able to prevent the attacker
exploiting his injected bit error, and can be achieved with only
software, so that it can be applied on the legacy systems.
Future works can keep going in this direction and try to
propose more software-based countermeasures.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the disclosure of rowhammer, a large number of
attacks leveraging it are presented, which break the memory
isolation between processes and make a great threat to the
system security. We propose a unified reference framework to
systematically analyze rowhammer attacks, discussing about
the attack origin and the intended implication, and further pro-
viding the methodology for conducting effective rowhammer
attacks. Using the proposed framework, we analyze existing
attacks and corresponding countermeasures, extracting primi-
tives used in them. Further, we also demonstrate the usefulness
of such a framework by highlighting how researchers is able to
find new combination of existing primitives or even add new
primitives to achieve novel rowhammer attacks, such as the
proposed expressive rowhammer attack using the disk cache.
Finally, we outlines possible future directions of rowhammer
attacks.
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